Where Canadiens History Changed Course

The recent passing of the Canadiens legendary General Manager Sam Pollock has revived looks into his accomplishments over his 14 years at the helm of the Habs from 1964 to 1978. The achievements of 9 Stanley Cups by Pollock during that time will be forever unparalled in hockey.
What I found extremely curious about Pollock's resume, is what happened to his team after he retired in 1978.

Blame it on changing era's, the return on players leaving the Canadiens fold trickled from a flow to a slow drip. Without Trader Sam running the show, the assets slowly dried up, and the Canadiens went from great teams, to simply a very good regular season team, and finally after the 1993 Cup, middle of the pack also-rans.

Towards the end of the Canadiens four Cup run in 1978, when GM Pollock retired, coach Scotty Bowman assumed he was in line for the GM's position. Pollock considered Bowman, but instead decided upon a businessman with little to no hockey managing experience in Irving Grundman.

Bowman, upset at not being handed the job, fled to Buffalo where he would assume both duties.

Pollock had stated at the time that he chose not to go with Bowman, as the coach would have dismantled the dynasty piece by piece in an attempt to turn over the aging lineup.

In retrospect, it might have been the most logical move. Incoming GM Grundman held onto many players years beyond their prime, and as you will see, the returns greatly explain the Canadiens downfall.

In fairness to Grundman and his scouting staff, luck was never on their side. While the organization drafted quality players such as Chris Chelios and Guy Carbonneau between 1980 and 1983, two other draft choices impacted the organization greatly.

Doug Wickenheiser, a can't miss prospect chosen first overall in 1980 was a complete bust.

Grundman managed to get the Hartford Whalers first choice in the 1984 draft for Pierre Larouche, all in hopes of landing budding superstar Mario Lemieux. Unfortunately, the Pittsburgh Penguins finished last overall and not the Whalers, whose 5th overall pick rendered the Canadiens one Petr Svoboda.
























Had the Magnificent Mario become Canadiens property, Grundman would have been hailed as a genius in the Pollock mold instead of a bumbling former bowling alley manager ill suited to run the Habs.

Grundman did as Bowman wouldn't have, and held on to the dynasty team a year or two too long. This is where the Canadiens history changed course.I've chosen a group of 27 players who participated in 5 Cups wins between 1973 and 1979 to illustrate what happened to the Habs dynasty. The lack of talent continuity is obviously apparent as diminishing returns prevented the Canadiens from maintaining previous heights. Although they managed 2 more Stanley Cups (1986, 1993) in the interim since, the depth has never been replaced.

The group of 27 players, divides itself a first group of 13 and a second one of 14.

The first group are players that the Canadiens received no dividend or returns from, as they all retired due to different scenarios. While some were simply destined to retire as career long Canadiens, other reasons played into it as well.

Jacques Lemaire
Jacques Laperriere
Mario Tremblay
Bob Gainey
Serge Savard
Frank Mahovlich
Pierre Mondou
Rejean Houle
Bill Nyrop
Henri Richard
Marc Tardiff
Ken Dryden
Guy Lafleur

13 players, including 9 Hall of Famers with no return value to the team.Richard, Laperriere, Savard, and Gainey retired due to their age.Cournoyer, Tremblay, Houle, and Mondou retired due to injury.Mahovlich and Tardiff went on to the WHA.Dryden, Lemaire, and Nyrop retired with much hockey left in them.Guy Lafleur was forced to retire as the Canadiens would not exercise his wish for a trade.Tardiff returned to the NHL with Quebec Nordiques.Lafleur, Savard and Nyrop made brief returns to the NHL with other teams.

























The second group of 14 includes players the Canadiens were able to get some return on, however small they were. Eight players descending from that group were members of Cup teams in 1986 and 1993.

It is interesting to note that backup goaltender Michel "Bunny" Larocque, two trades later, parlayed into Patrick Roy by sheer great luck. The return on Roy, as you will see detailed below, was unfortunately equally dismal.

Larry Robinson (FA Los Angeles)
Steve Shutt ( for future considerations to Los Angeles, reaquired by Montreal at the same price)
Guy Lapointe ( for St.Louis' 2nd rd pick, 1983 - Sergio Momesso)
Michel Larocque ( to Toronto for Robert Picard )
Doug Risebrough ( to Calgary for 2nd and 3rd rd picks '83,'84 - Todd Francis, Grahame Bonar)
Doug Jarvis ( with Englom, Langway, and Laughlin to Washington for Ryan Walter, Rick Green)
Brian Engblom ( with Jarvis, Langway, and Laughlin to Washington for Ryan Walter, Rick Green)
Rod Langway ( with Englom, Jarvis, and Laughlin to Washington for Ryan Walter, Rick Green)
Pete Mahovlich ( with Peter Lee to Pittsburgh for Pierre Larouche, Peter Marsh)Pierre Larouche ( to Hartford for 1st rd pick '84 - Petr Svoboda)
Yvon Lambert ( claimed by Buffalo in '81 waiver draft)
Rick Chartraw ( to Los Angeles for 2nd rd pick '83 - Claude Lemieux )
Mark Napier ( to Minnesota with Keith Acton for Bobby Smith)
Pierre Bouchard ( claimed on waivers by Washingston)

The second group of 14 produced only the 7 player assets listed below, who were in the organization from 1983-85. Six of them were on the '86 Cup winner, if you add in Patrick Roy, who had just been drafted in 1984. The final piece falling into the lineup was Brisebois, who would be on the '93 Cup winner.

Sergio Momesso ( to St. Louis with Vincent Riendeau for Jocelyn Lemieux and 2nd rd pick '89 - Patrice Brisebois)
Robert Picard ( to Winnipeg for 3rd rd pick '84 - Patrick Roy )
Ryan Walter ( FA Vancouver)
Rick Green ( to Detroit for Brad Layzell)
Petr Svoboda ( to Buffalo for Kevin Haller)
Claude Lemieux ( to New Jersey for Sylvain Turgeon)
Bobby Smith ( to Minnesota for 4th rd pick '92 - Louis Bernard

























From the 7 assets above, only Roy, Brisebois, and Haller are descendant players from the '70's dynasty that won the Cup in 1993.

Jocelyn Lemieux ( to Chicago for 3rd rd pick '90 - Charles Poulin)
Patrice Brisebois (FA Colorado)
Patrick Roy ( with Mike Keane to Colorado for Jocelyn Thibeault, Andrei Kovalenko, Martin Rucinski)
Kevin Haller ( to Philadelphia for Yves Racine)
Sylvain Turgeon ( claimed by Ottawa in expansion draft)

After the trading of Roy in 1995, the returns dimished at an even thinner rate. The 3 players received for Roy were turned over for a total of 12 players in 8 seasons.

No assets remain from the descendants of the Roy deal.

Jocelyn Thibeault ( with Dave Manson and Brad Brown to Chicago for Jeff Hackett, Eric Weinrich, Alain Nasreddine, Chris Dyment)
Andrei Kovalenko ( to Edmonton for Scott Thornton)
Martin Rucinski ( with Benoit Brunet to Dallas for Donald Audette, Shaun Van Allen)Yves Racine ( waivers San Jose)
Jeff Hackett ( to San Jose for Niklas Sundstrom)
Eric Weinrich ( to Boston for Patrick Traverse)
Alain Nasreddine ( to Edmonton with Igor Ulanov for Christian Laflamme, Mathieu Descoteaux)
Scott Thornton ( to Dallas for Juha Lind)
Donald Audette ( FA Florida)
Shaun Van Allen ( FA Ottawa)
Patrick Traverse (FA Dallas)
Niklas Sundstrom ( FA Overseas)
Juha Lind ( FA Overseas )
Christian Laflamme ( FA St.Louis)

As a result of the Roy deal, two successive goaltenders stopped pucks for the Canadiens, Jocelyn Thibeault, and then Jeff Hackett. While Hackett was traded away due to the emergence of Jose Theodore, Thibault is presently the backup goalie with the Sabres.

Added to the original 27 players, are 9 more were packaged in trades to aquire future assets. The nine include Lee, Acton, Laughlin, Riendeau, Keane, Manson, Brown, Brunet and Ulanov for a total of 36 players dealt away. For these 36 assets, the Canadiens aquired 34 bodies in return, 7 of which never player for the team.

Only Thibeault, Thornton, Rucinski, Nasreddine and Brisebois, remain active NHL'ers.

By 2002-03, all trickle downs from the 1970's had dried up as the Canadiens become playoff spectators.

Grundman's successor Serge Savard maintained a standard of excellence from 1984 to his firing in 1995.

Rejean Houle, a puppet GM of Habs president Ron Corey, sunk the ship beginning with the trading of Roy in 1995.

Since then, GM's Andre Savard and current man in charge Bob Gainey have replenished the Canadiens stock of players, and after a decade of bumbling, the Habs finally look to have a brighter future.

As of 2007, the Canadiens have no trickle down assets from the dynasty of the 1970's. All in all, a sad return on a glorious period.

Debunking The French Canadien Territorial Rule Myth

There is a popular myth, longstanding in fact, and surely perpetrated by decades of Maple Leafs frustration that the Montreal Canadiens superiority from the early 1950's to the late 1970's was due to the simple notion that they had territorial rights to the province of Quebec's two greatest hockey talents annually.

The myth has gained ground on the factual truth in many minds based on the coincidental perceived removal of such rights and the Habs descent down to normalness since the heyday of the dynasty years.

But the myth, hockey fans, is complete bunk!

The small sliver of truth and fact behind the one time territorial Habs clause fails to back up the claims of those who have cried "No Fair" like whining children for years.

I first remember heading about this when I was all of seven years old.

The myth was cemented into young impressionable minds in hockey rinks and schoolyards Canada wide by Maple Leafs fans needing a convinient excuse in explaining their own clubs decline.

I grew up with kids who believed it then. I know some of them as adults who still believe it today.

The twisted yarn is so maligned, it even now includes the drafting of Guy Lafleur first overall in 1971, as well as others, as part of it's Leaf derived legend.

If the myth were true, the Canadiens would have also snapped up Jean Ratelle, Rod Gilbert, and Gil Perreault among others. The possibilities are endless - they would have likely never lost a game, nevermind the Stanley Cup.

Looking back on it all now, on how the mistruth spread, it's become clearer as to why it would permeate logic, given the finger pointing nature of Leafs fans, who have consistantly failed to look in their backyard to explain their failings and past inferiorities.

It's almost as if they agreed in unison that the myth would be their battlecry, their common shield of armour in the face of defeat. One day, somewhere in time, a little light went off in someones head. I can almost see it now.

"Well no wonder the cheaters won all them damn Cups, the Kweebeckers got the two best Frenchman every year..."

I've long known the truth is othewise, and have long sought out a source that would explain it best, with insightful completeness and perspective.

With much talk of Canadiens drafts in the past few days, the old territorial rights rule reared its famaliar head in chat room talk, when somebody posted a link to hockey historian and trivia expert Liam Maguire's site. As a Canadiens fan himself, Maguire has also been confronted with this myth numerous times, and sets the record straight. He has interviewed many on this very subject, including Sam Pollock, Scotty Bowman, Dick Irvin, Marcel Pronovost, Rod Gilbert, Yvan Cournoyer and numerous others.

It seems the origin of the rule is as old as the NHL itself, going back to wartime days when the fortunes and faith of franchises fluctuated annually.


Contrary to popular belief, the NHL did not start out as an Original Six league. Many teams came and went, existing anywhere between two or three years up to a decade, including the original Ottawa Senators.










Not unlike today's revenue sharing programs amongst sports teams, league members back in the day, found creative ways to assist in each other in the help for financial survival. Often this was done by way of player and monetary loans, but what team owners discovered back then was that locals stars filled seats to great capacity.

This fact was evident even in pre-NHL days, and especially true in Montreal, where a rivalry was built up to fullfill a demand for a french team to compete against the english Montreal teams of the day, the Wanderers and Maroons.

One year after the birth of the Montreal Canadiens, known then as Le Club Athletic Canadiens, it was decided that this would become the franchise that would cater to the desires of the french speaking clientele. Slowly but surely it filled it's roster with french names and proceeded to become semi-successful on the ice, but teetering financially off it.

Over time, the Canadiens became the only Montreal franchise remaining, outliving the Maroons and winning Stanley Cups in 1916, 1924, 1930, and 1931. It fought on through hard times and financial up and downs, and during a spell in the late 1930's, the team was on the brink of folding.

It was around that time, that the idea came up to offer the Canadiens the exclusive rights to two players per year as a means of maintaining interest and ensuring financial success.














To quote Liam Maguire, "(It was) decided that the Montreal Canadiens could take any two players from the province of Quebec in a special draft. There was one rider however. None of these players could have already been previously signed to a C form (confirmation form) with any other club."

"At this time in the NHL and right through the late 60's amateur players were signed by NHL teams to C forms and then placed on their appropriate junior clubs or minor pro clubs depending on their age. The most extreme case of this was Bobby Orr. Orr signed a C form three weeks before his 12th birthday with the Boston Bruins. He was so young his parents signature was required. When he turned 14 he began playing for Boston's junior sponsored team, the Oshawa Generals. That's how Orr became a Bruin."

"From 1936-1943 Montreal protected 14 players through this special draft. Unfortunately none of them ever played a minute in the NHL. Reason being, anybody who could tie their skates and chew gum at the same time were already long signed by other NHL teams including the Canadiens who certainly wern't going to survive solely with this rule."

"The hope was that there would be a spark from signing a French Canadian kid, even better if he could play a bit. The thought was that this could help attendance and thereby help Montreal.

It never did. What really helped Montreal at that time were two shrewd moves. One, a trade with the Montreal Maroons which brought them Toe Blake and two, the signing of Elmer Lach to a C form, who was from Saskatchewan by the way. He was signed after the Rangers passed on him. Lach attended their camp first."



















The root of the myth may lie in the fact that just prior to the Habs landing Blake and Lach, the Canadiens first two stars were Edouard "Newsy" Lalonde and Aurel Joliat, both owners of French sounding names. Along Georges Vezina and the Cleghorn brothers, these two succeeding hero's, who were at one time traded for one another, were important facets of the Canadiens success in the 1920' and 1930's.

What many may not know, is that neither Lalonde or Joliat was a home grown talent. Lalonde was billingual, and was born in my hometown of Cornwall, Ontario (a great source of pride!), and Joliat was an Ottawa born player, of Swiss descent.

In the excellent book "Lions In Winter", by Chris Goyens and Allan Turowetz, Joliat comments on his being aquired from the Saskatoon Shieks for the popular Lalonde in 1922. As Habs fans were upset at seing a french speaking player leave, Joliat adds, "Still, it was easier for (GM Leo) Dandurand to trade for me than for a Dick Smith."

The Canadiens other big star of the time, possibly the first true superstar of hockey, Howie Morenz, also has a Swiss background.

Maguire further clarifies the myth's mystique by stating that the reasons the Habs survived the 1930's doldrums had nothing to do with the territorial rule, and everything to do with Lach and Blake working out brilliantly with a player the Habs didn't have in their future plans.













"The rest of the league passed on Montreal GM Tommy Gorman's offer of a trade for what seemed to be a very brittle but explosive goal scorer named Maurice Richard. Richard had suffered injury after injury in his first three years of pro. Gorman tried to unload him but nobody wanted him."

"Needless to say Richard's coming out party in 1943-44 and the subsequent effect he had on the game in the next 17 years has been well documented but suffice to say, these were the three major reasons (Lach, Blake, Richard) for the success of the Habs over a nearly two decade span - not some bullcrap rule that although was well intentioned did nothing to extend Montreal's stay in the NHL at that time. In fact they were even worse in 1940 than they were in 1936."

Bolstered by the "Punch Line", the Canadiens would win the Stanley Cup in 1944 and 1946, but Maguire states that there were two other pieces to the puzzle that would ensure Canadien supremacy for the coming decades.

"It happened in 1946 and 1947, respectively. With the French Canadian rule now rescinded and Montreal rolling with two Cup victories in a three year span something else was going to be needed for the franchise to rise to the extreme greatness they would see in a few short years."

To the distress of Maple Leafs fans, they unwittingly assisted the Canadiens a second time, and in similar fashion. The first had been the firing of coach Dick Irvin Sr. years earlier, who continued to be as successful with Montreal as he'd been with Chicago and Toronto.

"Toronto owner Conn Smythe fired Frank Selke Sr. and Montreal quickly hired him. Selke had a vision about a series of teams in the minor leagues that would be stocked with players that Montreal would sign to C forms. These minor league teams and the players on them were soon to be known as a farm system."

"This was the origin of the farm system as we know it today. It took the rest of the NHL 2-3 years to catch on to this idea but they did and they've all benefited from it but Montreal had a tremendous head start and in some instances they purchased the rights to an entire league to get a certain player."

"They did this for Jean Beliveau and Bobby Rousseau. In Beliveau's case it didn't matter because he told the Habs to get stuffed anyway. He was happy in Quebec and there were only two players in the NHL making more money than Jean who was in the QSHL. That was Rocket Richard and Gordie Howe. Finally Selke was able to sign Beliveau in 1953 when as he put it, " I opened up the vault and said help yourself Jean!" Great quote"

"The move in 1947 was the hiring of Sam Pollock. Pollock came under the tutelage of Selke and finally in 1963 became his successor as GM of the Canadiens."

"In 1963 the NHL finally realized there were a glut of players, post second World War 2 births, that were coming of age to play in the NHL and even with the C form system, stones were being left unturned. For the first time a draft was implemented. There was never any thought that this would one day become the life blood of the NHL."

"In 1963 the NHL finally realized there were a glut of players, post second World War 2 births, that were coming of age to play in the NHL and even with the C form system, stones were being left unturned. For the first time a draft was implemented. There was never any thought that this would one day become the life blood of the NHL."

"At the time the six NHL teams would draft in a rotating order any player who had not signed a C form. Ken Dryden was a draft pick of the Boston Bruins. Boston traded Dryden to Montreal."

"In 1963, the French Canadian rule was brought back for the Montreal Canadiens. It was not necessary, no question about it but Selke and Pollock worked a sweet deal and got it back on the books however the same rules applied. The player could not have signed a C form with any other team."

"From 1963-1967 none of the players Montreal selected played one minute in the NHL, ever. Finally in 1968, they drafted their first live one. A goalie named Michel Plasse."










"In 1969, it was determined that this would be the final year of the draft in this manner and the sponsorship of Junior A teams would cease to be. All players were to be 20 years of age or older and they would be eligible for a Universal Amateur Draft."

"Montreal was given one final kick at the French Canadian can and they made the most of it by selecting Rejean Houle and Marc Tardif. That was it for the French rule."










"By then Sam Pollock or Trader Sam as he was known, was working magic year in and year out on draft day and by flipping players in Montreal's farm system that had been so expertly set up years before by Selke and ran by Pollock, for draft picks. Players like Guy Lafleur, Steve Shutt, Mario Tremblay, several others, were selected with picks that Pollock acquired through trades."

This should clear up any misconception about this long believed fallacy, born primarily by frustrated anti-Montreal fans who for decades suffered through parade after Stanley Cup parade.

10 Costly Mistakes Made by The Canadiens Since 1977

I've often wondered if history could be undone, what the result would be on the present.

Applying such a "Back To The Future" angle on the history of the Montreal Canadiens allows one to reconsider many events that transpired over the course of the last 30 years.

Using 20/20 hindsight is no brave musing - sports fans are well accustomed to being Monday morning quarterbacks. It is fairly easy to identify what has gone wrong in any era of a sports franchise. In terms of the Canadiens spiral from Stanley Cup dynasty of the late seventies to the average team of today, many errors in judgement have resulted in the team being a middle of the pack squad.

Often the Canadiens of recent years have been afflicted with terms such as "once proud", "hard luck", and "falling from grace or glory", so much so that one would confuse them with the Maple Leafs or the Islanders. While Montreal sat outside the playoff picture this spring, their so called decline, in perspective, is far from being as catastrophic as some would have believe.

Since 1979, and with the NHL adding 12 new franchises, every teams odds of winning the Stanley Cup have decreased proportionately. In the 27 seasons played since then, only the Islanders, Edmonton Oilers, Detroit Red Wings and New Jersey Devils won won more Cups. Colorado and Pittsburgh, as well as Montreal, are the only other teams with multiple Cups. Five other franchises have won single Cups.

If most franchises were dealt the fate of winning but one Stanley Cup per decade, they'd gladly accept that fate. Not in Montreal, where expectations are constantly high, and errors are scrutinized beyond the realm of understanding in most NHL cities.

If only one of the following errors of judgement from the past were to be undone, it would have greatly affected the teams future. Each mistake had pronouced consequences which led to the weakening of team over the years.

It is, of course, futile in a sense, to dwell on those errors - the only upside of going over them is to recognize when they are about to occur again and avoiding them the next time around.
Chronologically, here are 10 mistakes any Hab fan would wince at in hindsight.

10 - Not choosing Mike Bossy in the 1977 Entry Draft.

Who knew that Bossy would string off 9 straight 50 goal seasons in the NHL? Canadiens head scout Ron Caron had an inkling when he pronounced to GM Sam Pollack that he'd found the next Guy Lafleur. Fourteen teams passed on Bossy before the Islanders wisely chose him. Bossy was considered by many to be a soft player in a softer league and many disregarded the compass in his eye. From 1973 to 1977, Bossy rifled off seasons of 70, 84, 79, and 75 with the Laval National of the QMJHL. Still many NHL teams passed on him, including Toronto twice with back to back picks at 11 and 12. The Canadiens opted for a fairly decent player, the Toronto Marlborough's Mark Napier, who would give them a pair of 40 goal season before being packaged off to Minnesota for center Bobby Smith. It was often suggested in hindsight that Bossy would never have met the same fate in Montreal, that a sniper with defensive laxes would have taken too long to find his place in Montreal. I never bought that angle. Five years prior, the Habs drafted a similar player in Steve Shutt. While Shutt's ascent was steady, not immediate, who's to suggest it could not have been the same for Bossy.

9 - Choosing Irving Grundman over Scotty Bowman to succeed Sam Pollack as the Canadiens GM.













Grundman was not a sound hockey man in the eyes of many, often being termed a glorified bowling alley manager by most. He was chosen to succed Sam Pollack based on the fear of what Scotty Bowman, if handed the position, would do to the team, which was dismantle it piece by aging piece. He had been being groomed for the job by Pollack himself before the reigns were turned over in 1978. The Canadiens upper brass wanted Pollack to stay on for a longer term and hoped that Bowman would do so also. With Bowman having little faith in Grundman's capabilities he left after two seasons for what the coach thought were greener pastures in a dual role as coach and GM with the Buffalo Sabres. Spurning the man who would become the winningest coach in the game's history was a giant slip. Grundman would soon be taken to task for passing over local star Denis Savard in the 1980 draft. The bumbling continued as a succession of coaches, including Claude Ruel and Bernie Geoffrion passed behind the bench while the Canadiens raced toward mediocrity. Grundman's era was defined by turmoil and turnover. During his five year stint at the Habs helm, his failing to adequately replace those players that Bowman hinted at moving, dried up to teams depth of draft picks and youth. While some of the remaining vets had enough in the tank to give the Canadiens a surprise Stanley Cup in 1986, only two draft choices in the Grundman era, Chris Chelios and Guy Carbonneau, would have a profound effect on the teams future. After dealing future Norris Trophy winner Rod Langway, along with three other players, in a package to Washington in 1982, Grundman's coffin was prepared. He was fired in April of 1983. He last made headlines in January of 2005, when as a city councellor in Montreal, he admitted to taking bribes in a zoning scandal and was sentenced to 23 months of community service, oddly enough.

8 - Feable Returns on Aging Veterans.








As mentioned before, Grundman stuck to his plan and kept many of the teams aging stars as they passed their prime into their twilight years. Ken Dryden, Yvan Cournoyer, Serge Savard (who would become his successor), Guy Lafleur (under the Savard reign) and Jacques Lemaire all retired with no return. Guy Lapointe, Steve Shutt, and others were traded off for pitances of their worth as their play declined. Roughly half of the team that won four straight Cups were gone with little to nothing to show for it. That is sadly, the Grundman resume. When Serge Savard was named as the next GM of the team, the Canadiens were literally starting over from scratch.

7 - Humiliating Wickenheiser.








One of Grundman's better moves involved a trade that flip-flopped first round picks with the Colorado Rockies in 1980. The Rockies assumed the Habs 18th overall pick while Montreal cashed in with the first overall choice. The local media were all in favor of local product Denis Savard, but Grundman went with the consensus choice of Doug Wickenheiser, who'd scored 89 goals with the Regina Pats the previous year. The GM was raked over the coals for ignoring the local star but the hockey intelliagenca would back the belaboured GM as Wick was clearly called the more refined player at that point. 89 goals in the WHL doesn't lie. Hindsight would actually suggest that the best player in the draft was chosen 7th, Paul Coffey. Where the Canadiens thinkers goofed big time was in sitting out Wickenheiser against Savard's Blackhawks on the opening game of the season. Savard shone as the game's first star, and the Habs prodigy was stung and embarrassed. The local press never let up and the cumulative effect on Wickenheiser, as Savard's star rose, was complete humiliation. Further along, Wickenheiser was being groomed as a two-way center and kept away from Guy Lafleur as a linemate. Checks on his character were given failling grades each year, as the player progressed to become a 25 goal scorer in his third season as a 21 year old. It still wasn't good enough, especially compared to Savard's 100 point seasons. Wickenheiser was shipped in a multi-player deal the following year. Had Montreal only let him play his game, perhaps the 6' 5", 220 lb center could have lived up to his potential. First overall picks are a rare commodity to an organization, and montreal wated the only one it had in this timespan.

6 - Corey Forces His Vision Upon Savard










Serge Savard was doing quite well for the team as GM when the man who hired him, Ron Corey, began meddling in his business. Under the former defenseman, the Canadiens had won the Cup in 1986 and made a return trip to lose the final in '89. Corey's background with the Nordiques hid a thinly disguised love of the Canadiens saintly image, and he did not like what he saw. Fiery coach Pat Burns led a group of players with mounting off-ice reputations. With Claude Lemieux as the reigning NHL's public enemy number one, and the bar strip scandals involving Shayne Corson and Chris Chelios, Corey sought to purge the Habs of bad-boy images. In doing so, Corey underestimated the guts and blood contribution of these warriors to the teams overall complexion. His meddling began when he forced Savard to deal off Norris Trophy winner Chelios, who'd been named one of the team's co-captains along with Guy Carbonneau (who Corey would later also have expelled for similar reasons). When the opportunity arose for GM Savard to obtain the Hawks Denis Savard, correcting an old Grundman faux-pas, Corey saw a public relations coup in the making and ordered the deal done. The headlines made for a big splash accross the media, but Savard, Denis, was in total decline. GM Savard never hid his contempt for having to make the deal, and his relation with Corey began to sour. Corey's biggest fear, was in being eventually replaced as team president by ever more popular Savard. Many of Savard's next deals shared the same theme, and faltered for the exact same reason. GM Savard found Chelios to be a cornerstone of the team, and hardly wanted to part with him. Watching Chelios in 2007, one can only wonder, what if?

5 - Major Trades and the Captain Shuffle

In an attempt to breath offensive life and change the room atmosphere of the team, GM Savard parted with a string of players wearing the CH tattooed on their hearts. Guy Carbonneau, Eric Desjardins, John Leclair, Gilbert Dionne, Matthieu Schneider, and Kirk Muller were all dealt off for what seemed good returns at the moment, but the soul of the team had been ripped out. Finding a suitable character player to wear the "C" became an issue for the omnipresent media hounds to ponder. After Carbonneau's fickle finger salute earned him a ticket out of town, Muller filled the role briefly until traded. The team who hadn't traded a captain since 1962 was about to deal of a third in Mike Keane, generously thrown in as part of the Roy deal in 1995, simply because the team president felt an english captain was unsuitable. Ensuing captain Pierre Turgeon hung around long enough to transport a barely lit torch from the Forum to the Bell Centre before asking off the ship. Vincent Damphousse was fairly effective captain during the teams most dismal years. The combined multitude of trades and lack of leadership led to the team became ordinary, heartless, and dull in record time.

4 - The Housecleaning of 1995

With the Canadiens missing the 1995 playoffs in a strike shortened season, a panic mode set in. Team president Ronald Corey was aware of infighting amongst players on the team and wanted to make changes. GM Serge Savard preached patience, but when the 1995-96 edition of the Habs got off to an 0-5 start, Corey wanted coach Jacques Demers fired. During the 1995 calander year the Canadiens had traded away important team pieces, but those changes did little to avert the teams misfortune. Savard flatly refused to place the blame on coach Demers and refused to fire him. Corey couldn't understand that Savard was on the side of stability, and sent his GM packing as well as his coaching staff. What ensued was a debacle of major consequences that would send the team spiralling for the next decade.

3 - Hiring Inexperienced Puppets

In a bumbling showcase of ineptitude, Corey was left to his own devices and promptly hung himself as he scrambled to replace Demers and Savard overnight. It was a comedy worthy of the Maple Leafs worst missteps when Corey introduced the suitable replacements after less than a weeks search. The PR machine rolled out the BS promptly as the attributes of new GM Rejean Houle and coach Mario Tremblay were bantered about with great pomp and circumstances. They were both former Habs of glory, we were fed, so hence they must be proven winners. Initial reaction was somewhat tempered when Tremblay immediatly set a Habs coaching record by winning his first six games. Everything unravelled from there. Despite his faults, credit must go in some part to the coach who managed to steer this mess of a team into the playoffs two seasons straight. Had he been groomed for the job in any way, it might have prepared him to deal with the brick aimed at his face that he never saw coming. Houle was primarily a puppet of Corey's, who had no prior imput in the team and no one left to consult on matters of importance. He was also led blindly to his day of infamy.

2 - Dealing a Hall Of Fame Goalie on 72 Hours Notice

The Patrick Roy of 1995 was by no means a happy camper. He was essentially the captain of the team, while also being it's most controvercial dressing room member. After Roy lost an ally in Demers, his composure frittered away, making his play a shadow of its former self. Off ice issues were also at the heart of his unhappiness and he decried the trading away of several key team members. To put it point blank - he and Tremblay hated each others faces. Words exchanged between the two dated back a few years and the wounds were still open between he and the former broadcaster turned coach. No need to pour over the details of a certain December night in '95 - suffice to say only that it was destined to happen considering the relationship between the two. That was something that Corey never took into consideration upon hiring the inexperienced duo. No thought was given to repairing the burnt bridges - Roy was going to be dealt. Houle went back to the scene of a previous trade inquiry by Savard (Roy to the Avalanche for Fiset, Nolan, and Deadmarsh) and tangoed with the ever sly Pierre Lacroix and came out fleeced. In return for his franchise player, Houle was served three journeyman players at best. Little thought was given to upping the ante by negotiating with other teams, they just wanted the festering Roy scenario out of their hair as quickly as possible.

1 - The Alex Kovalev Hot Potato

The Andre Savard and Bob Gainey regimes were comparitively quiet as opposed to what had gone on in the years prior. With the Canadiens meadering towards a perenial middle of the pack team, there has been nowhere to go but up. A succession of halfway decent coaches came and went until hope sprung eternal with the announcement of Bob Gainey as the teams new GM. Both GM's have managed to stockpile a depleted farm system with a bevy of talented prospects. The Gainey era has been pretty much error and controversy free until the dark side of Alex Kovalev reared it's ugly head this past season. Has this enigmatic and moody player's situation been mismanaged? Does his personality clash with that of present coach Carbonneau? Could it be that Kovalev simply had a bad year? It is starting to look as thought the player is more bother than he is worth. Whether Gainey is able to ship him off before further internal damage is done remains to be seen. The issue is certain to remain a hot topic until it is dealt with in definitive fashion.